http://www.trustthevote.org/why_complexity_look_balkans Re-inventing How America Votes Thu, 22 Sep 2011 15:21:03 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 http://www.trustthevote.org/why_complexity_look_balkans/comment-page-1#comment-10 jsebes Tue, 04 Mar 2008 01:01:30 +0000 http://wordpress.trustthevote.org/2008/02/03/why-complexity-look-to-the-balkans#comment-10 Although parts of Brandon's excellent suggestions are not immediately compatible with the practices (and in some cases regulations) of today's county elections offices, you can bet that OSDV public demonstrations of reference systems will be as simple as that. And as they evolve to support existing practices, they will continue to be operable in as simple a manner. Although parts of Brandon’s excellent suggestions are not immediately compatible with the practices (and in some cases regulations) of today’s county elections offices, you can bet that OSDV public demonstrations of reference systems will be as simple as that. And as they evolve to support existing practices, they will continue to be operable in as simple a manner.

]]> http://www.trustthevote.org/why_complexity_look_balkans/comment-page-1#comment-9 Brandon F Tue, 05 Feb 2008 03:15:18 +0000 http://wordpress.trustthevote.org/2008/02/03/why-complexity-look-to-the-balkans#comment-9 Exec Summary: <br> NO custom paper sizes - standard 20# 8.5 x 11 inch paper Standard font sizes - how about courier 10 Yes, use more than one sheet per ballot when needed. <br> DETAILS: <br> Of course, I think controlling access to paper ballots is only reasonable. <br> Paper ballots (standard 20# 8.5x11 inch) with pencil markings -standardized (courier, for example - keep it simple - not custom paper sizes, font sizes, you get the idea) location of "bullet markings"- would seem that scanners (standard 8.5x11) have little risk to damage ballots (and considering copier products, the hardware is cheap) - BUT your point is of course very important - not to allow willful damage/destruction of ballots. <br> The idea is that most anyone/organization -which qualifies to get access to ballots- could afford to bring computer and a scanner to their local polling place to help audit/double-check results. Keep the costs low. AND if these automation products are too expensive, just do it the old fashion manual count - especially for small voting sites. <br> I'm glad to read you are aware of other countries election procedures. I would also think that Carter Center and others: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_monitoring might well have good ideas/experiences, especially on audit techniques. <br> side note: Traditionally exit polls done by professional pollsters were used to very accurately predict end results - and therefore good to spot "suspect results". I have never heard why these pollsters lost their accuracy except that people started lying to pollsters in 2000. very suspicious to my mind - i.e. what is really going on? break down of techniques? too much cost savings? something more sinister? Exec Summary:

NO custom paper sizes – standard 20# 8.5 x 11 inch paper
Standard font sizes – how about courier 10
Yes, use more than one sheet per ballot when needed.

DETAILS:

Of course, I think controlling access to paper ballots is only reasonable.

Paper ballots (standard 20# 8.5×11 inch) with pencil markings -standardized (courier, for example – keep it simple – not custom paper sizes, font sizes, you get the idea) location of “bullet markings”- would seem that scanners (standard 8.5×11) have little risk to damage ballots (and considering copier products, the hardware is cheap) – BUT your point is of course very important – not to allow willful damage/destruction of ballots.

The idea is that most anyone/organization -which qualifies to get access to ballots- could afford to bring computer and a scanner to their local polling place to help audit/double-check results. Keep the costs low. AND if these automation products are too expensive, just do it the old fashion manual count – especially for small voting sites.

I’m glad to read you are aware of other countries election procedures. I would also think that Carter Center and others:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_monitoring
might well have good ideas/experiences, especially on audit techniques.

side note: Traditionally exit polls done by professional pollsters were used to very accurately predict end results – and therefore good to spot “suspect results”. I have never heard why these pollsters lost their accuracy except that people started lying to pollsters in 2000. very suspicious to my mind – i.e. what is really going on? break down of techniques? too much cost savings? something more sinister?

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