Posted in Voting System Technology on Oct 16th, 2009
We now have a federally certified voting system product that has completed the required testing by a federally certified independent test lab. That’s a milestone in itself, as is the public disclosure of some of the results of testing process. Thanks to that disclosure, though, we now know that the test lab did practically zero [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Oct 9th, 2009
Another in our series of real life stories … how it actually works for real election officials to test a new voting system that they might be adopting for use in the state.
The backplot is that New York State has been unwilling to give up its admittedly no-longer-legal* lever machines, until the the state Board [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Sep 18th, 2009
In a couple of prior posts, I explained the “gold copy” or “trusted build” concept, and the role of EAC, NIST, and test labs. I can’t seem to completely bury this tale, because it raised another question about the processing of checking a voting system to see if it is legit: “Why is this checking [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Aug 26th, 2009
I recently commented on specific connection, in the case of the TrustTheVote project, of open source methods and the issue of identifying a “gold build” of a certified voting system. As a reminder to more recent readers, most states have laws that require election officials to use only those specific voting system products that were [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Aug 24th, 2009
Scanning the news last week, I found rumors of Premier Systems (the voting system vendor formerly known ad Diebold) going open-source, and of the Federal government pondering cases where voting system test results should be confidential. An interesting juxtaposition!
The first item I call a rumor not because I disbelieve the blogger in question, but because [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Jul 23rd, 2009
There’s a fascinating nugget inside of a fine legal story unfolding in Arizona. I know that not all our readers are thrilled by news of court cases related to election law and election technology, so I’ll summarize the legal story in brief, and then get to the nugget. The Arizona Court of Appeals has [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Jul 9th, 2009
Today’s posting landed in my lap in the form of a note from election tech colleague and Pitt researcher Collin Lynch, as part of a discussion about the role of the Federal government (specifically the Election Assistance Commission, or EAC) in “fostering innovation” in the market for voting systems, and ensuring a “healthy market”. Well, [...]
Posted in Uncategorized, Voting System Technology on Mar 12th, 2009
I got a great and deceptively simple question recently: what guidelines should be used for testing of voting machines?
Posted in Uncategorized, Voting System Technology on Mar 9th, 2009
It never ceases to amaze me how often, and in what varied circumstances, I meet people who are not only quite clued in about election technology reform, but also surprising aware of some of the devils that lurk in the details. Today’s devil: "field validation" of voting devices, or: if I went to vote in a precinct, and someone told me I was about to vote on the wonderful new trustworthy voting system that I had heard about, how would I know that that was the device I was about to use?
Posted in Uncategorized on Mar 28th, 2008
There’s a pretty regular stream of news about activities in the office of California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, de-certifying or re-certifying voting systems following the results of the state’s top-to-bottom review. Rather than making an up to the minute comment, I thought it would be useful to re-visit what I think is one of the more notable past scenes in the on-going drama.
The OSDV Foundation is a
pending
501(c)(3) non-profit California public benefit corporation.
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