Posted in Voting System Technology on Dec 7th, 2009
Today I provide the next step in clarifying TTV goals in relation to discussions with election transparency advocates. Regarding the previous posting, I want to emphasize that voting machines — in this case we focus on paper ballot scanning machines — are a transparency problem, if there is no human involvement in counting paper ballots, [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Nov 24th, 2009
The reports of computer viruses in NY voting machines — though spurious — cause me to return to a basic mantra of TrustTheVote: we do technology development so that election tech helps inspire public confidence in elections, rather than erode it.
The NY case is a great example of erosion, but also a cautionary tale for [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Nov 23rd, 2009
I wrote before that this month’s re-count activity in Pennsylvania was notable because of the variety of voting methods used there, and hence the variety of recounting methods needed. In contrast to the Lackawanna county that I mentioned specifically, there are many counties in PA that use completely paperless DRE voting machines. In these cases, [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Oct 15th, 2009
Kudos to Brad Friedman for making a good call on a subtle point in his comment on my posting about Bo Lipari’s coverage of the NY State testing of voting systems. Brad objects to my statement that lever machines are not compliant with the Help Amercia Vote Act (HAVA).
And rightly so! The bad news about [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Aug 26th, 2009
I recently commented on specific connection, in the case of the TrustTheVote project, of open source methods and the issue of identifying a “gold build” of a certified voting system. As a reminder to more recent readers, most states have laws that require election officials to use only those specific voting system products that were [...]
Posted in Election Adminstration Technology, Voting System Technology on Aug 20th, 2009
Some readers may sigh relief at the news that today’s post is the last (for a while at least!) in a series about the use of vote-count auditing methods to detect a situation in which an election result was garbled by the computers used to create them. Today, a little reality check on the use [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Aug 14th, 2009
Recently I’ve made a series of posts seemingly obsessed with chanting “audit, audit, …” mantra-like, to put readers into a trance. For those of you still awake enough to want to know how to find out whether election results were garbled by the computers used to create them, today we have some more answers. The [...]
Posted in Election Adminstration Technology, Open Source on Aug 13th, 2009
In this week’s news we have a classic example of how transparency (a.k.a. “open government”) has enormous potential to defuse some thorny political issues that can rise to the highest heights of U.S. political news. The news is about Karl Rove’s involvement in Bush-administration actions to dismiss some U.S. Attorneys, including David Iglesias.
A New York [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Aug 12th, 2009
A good question re-surfaced for us as we participated in the National Civic Summit recently. The issue was and remains about identifying a “gold build,” that is, when there is a particular system/version that is certified for use as a voting system, how should election officials know that the systems that they deployed are systems [...]
Posted in Voting System Technology on Aug 11th, 2009
That’s a catchy blog headline, I hope, or at least an important issue. But I’ve fooled you because while answering the question, I am going to discuss “audit” again. I wrote earlier that one kind of audit is performed by election officials to detect errors in voting machines, or to put it another way, to [...]
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