At any rate, I’m not really worried about any “due process” dilutions (that is, giving greater evidential review powers to reexamination examiners who I understand are special, more experienced examiners in the corps) somehow chilling the filing of “worthy” BMPs. I’ve not read section 18 (but I will now! great blog post!), but I hope to find that the overarching spirit of section 18 was to prevent banks (who albeit, have lobbying power) from being extorted by litigious NPLs.

Today:
…there are NOT appropriate steps that make sure the outcome of elections, can withstand scrutiny…

Before the next election (fed, state, local):
…there WILL be appropriate steps to ensure the outcome…

Good News:
Wisconsin’s state wide vote count accuracy rate is approx 99.82%.
(Put another way, its error rate is approx 0.18%) These numbers
were figured from the raw info found on WI GAB public web page
for the justice race recount.

Wisconsin seems to have a higher consideration for voters’ “Full
Voting Rights” than many other states that have been reviewed.

One of the good steps Wisconsin has is the higher recount
consideration levels. Some states only allow a niggardly 0.1%.

A “Fill Voting Right” vote count should have three major steps:

1. Closing Count on election day.
a) All ballots should be counted on election day at their assigned
precincts. Yes, that includes early ballots, absentee ballots,
military ballots…etc, and electionday ballots. (there should be
no provisional ballots…if the want-to-be voter qualifies, the
voter get a ballot.)
b) Complete election day reports; seal machines, if used;…etc.
c) and before workers and official go home perform step 2.

2. Verification hand count.
a) Hand count every vote on every ballot and record results on
verification count report. This count will include voters intent.
b) If the verification count equals the closing count, then the
closing count becomes the official count for that precinct.
c) If the verification count is not the same as the closing count,
then the verification count becomes the official count for that
precinct.

3. Recount
a) Anyone can request a recount.
b) A fee should be charged with the request. (fee refundable if
outcome changes)
c) The election budget shall cover the cost of the recount.

These three steps should be applied to all elections (fed, state, local).

The location of these three step should be published and made open
to the public.

These three steps shall be made part of election laws…and then
spelled out in election procedures.

These three steps give honor and respect to the voters…and voters
need to pay-back by volunteering as a electionworker/official.

These three step may/will minimize the chain-of-custody issues
throughout the counting process.

Of great importance the above three steps move the public confidence
level from 0% to 100%. Right now in many states this level is at 0%.

These three steps give the voter prime considerations…not to us
election workers and election officials. Thats why we workers and
officials volunteered…we are here to serve.

Thanks and Good Luck,

Frank Henry
Election Worker
Former Election Official
(Election Integrity (EI) Observer)
Cottonwood, Arizona
Tel: 928-649-0249
e-mail: fmhenry4@netzero.com

“It’s a bad idea to trust poll workers to accurately and honestly perform the check…”

As I have hosted the local polling place for quite a number of years, in my experience poll workers are trying to be both honest and accurate. (Not that they had any choice of anything else in my polling place – but there was never a conflict between my ethics and that manifested by my poll workers.)

Lets be very clear on the critical part of the problem … poll workers have very limited information and time with which to find a solution … but as a pragmatic matter, I think that particular part of the process works very well. Going into the polling place, looking at folk who may be your neighbors, makes claiming to be someone you are not … is subjectively very risky … unless the polling place serves so many folk that anonymity is expected.

On a purely analytic basis, the process looks more risky than in practice.

On the flip side, I view the vote-by-mail process as enormously … nay, VASTLY weaker and easier to subvert. The weak spots in the current vote-by-mail scheme are radically weaker then the old fashioned polling place – when accounting for usual human tendencies.

With regards to provisional votes … how many regular folk believe their votes are counted, and make a difference? In the current voting process, regular folk have no idea if their vote is counted, and vote more as a matter of principle. No one knows if they made an actual measurable difference.

The current voting process has near zero confidence on the part of the bulk of voters (yet some folk always vote … in hope of the best outcome). Noting the idealism inherent in regular voters should not be a small thing.

Also see letters from the canvass board to the SOS at :
http://www.glassballotbox.org/journal/2010/12/5/saguache-county-colorado-2010-election-irregularities.html